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AVERY, Donald H. The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied 
Military Technology during the Second World War. Toronto, University 
of Toronto Press, 1998: 
Few historians of Canadian science will disagree with the suggestion 
that the period from 1939 to 1945 was markedly different from the 
years that preceded or followed; never before or since has scientific 
endeavour been so closely integrated, and on such a scale, with 
military activity. Donald Avery, in The Science of War: Canadian Scientists 
and Allied Military Technology during the Second World War, is very 
much within this mold, noting in one instance that "The Second 
World War differed substantially from the First World War" in the 
production of "new weapons and techniques, often with little aware-
ness of their operational purpose../' (p. 4) 
The contribution Canadian scientists made to that conflict's opera-
tions is thus an important theme in Avery's book, but there are others; 
110 Book Review / Compte rendu 
he also examines how war changed Canada's scientific community 
and he takes a look at the ethical debate over the role it played in the 
creation of destructive technologies; in discussing the latter he also 
studies security issues and the postwar activities of the Canadian 
Association of Scientific Workers. With these themes permeating the 
narrative, Avery traces the development of such projects as radar, 
proximity fuses, RDX explosives, chemical and biological warfare, 
and atomic research; left to other researchers to study in detail are 
aeronautical engineering, operational research, code breaking, and 
military medicine (p. 11), gaps which testify to the breadth and depth of 
scientific work carried out in the 1939-45 war. 
The reader should be warned, however. Although Avery narrows 
his topic to increase understanding, the result is not necessarily an 
easy read because he uses scientific terms without always defining 
their meaning. For example, how is one supposed to determine the 
significance of Otto Maas' publications on "equations of state, viscos-
ities, sound propagation, electrolyte phenomena, surface tension, 
specific heats," etc (p. 26)? Why is a 10 cm wavelength important in 
aerial nightfighting radar (p. 73)? What is a wave guide (p. 90), or a 
coincidence fuse (p. 103), or a spin-type battery (p. 104)? The latter is 
an excellent example of how more detailed explanation could lead 
the reader to a much greater comprehension of the subject; proximity 
fuses functioned by incorporating a small electronic device which set 
off the explosive in the shell when close enough to an aircraft to do 
damage, greatly increasing the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery by 
doing away with the need for a direct hit. Powering the device, 
however, was a battery which, like all others, had a limited shelf life 
and hence might not function on the day it was needed; the answer 
was to keep the battery inert by separating its acids with glass dividers 
which broke at the moment of firing — an ingeniously simple solu-
tion. 
Furthermore, since The Science of War will no doubt stand for some 
time as the main reference work on the subject — and deservedly so 
— the reader should also be warned of the occasional inaccuracy. For 
example, the 1923 Nobel prize for physiology /medicine went only to 
Banting and MacLeod, not Best and Collip as well (p. 31), an issue 
that has raised no little controversy since. Also, the Department of 
Munitions and Supply did not predate the outbreak of war, as Avery 
implies (p. 107). But to be fair, such errors are rare, symptomatic of 
the author's conscientiousness not only in carrying out research but 
in turning raw data into prose. 
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Indeed, The Science of War is an educational experience as it pro-
vides a wealth of detail on such topics as the international back-
ground to Canadian research (e.g. the multi-nation effort to produce 
a proximity fuse), on how the Canadian scientific community devel-
oped ever closer ties with its US counterpart, and on the importance 
of liaison given the developments mentioned above. Relationships 
were not always cordial, however, and Avery points out how Great 
Britain was no less than patronizing towards Canadian efforts in the 
realm of radar, at least in its early days (p. 24), while even within 
Canada there was occasional conflict over scientific and related issues. 
Communication between the Royal Canadian Navy and the National 
Research Council was often poor as the latter attempted to develop a 
radar system suitable for ships (p. 89); while C.J. Mackenzie, head of 
the NRC, did not get along at all well with George Wright in the 
development of RDX explosive (p. 113). Though he did not set out to 
do so, Avery helps explode the myth that the war against the Axis was 
a shining example of harmonious teamwork. 
And the end of the conflict was not the end of the story, Avery 
noting that the Cold War would also call for the mobilization of 
science (p. 255), though on a different scale and organized in a 
different manner. Still, the previous conflict provides many lessons 
for the historian, including the role of scientific managers (p. 256), 
the need for the scientific community to create coping strategies to 
deal with Canada's "subordinate military status/' (p. 258) the reality 
of relationships with the US and UK (p. 260), and, perhaps above all, 
the stresses war imposes on those who fight it and those who support 
the fighters. In his concluding chapter Avery quotes Frederick Ban-
ting, who as early as 1940 found that "It is hardly possible for one 
small brain to accomplish the various tasks I have set myself. But it is 
war." (p. 262) So it is. 
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